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I. INTRODUCTION
International law likes to imagine itself as neutral, dispassionate, and prin-
cipled, operating above the petty squabbles and prejudices of states and peoples.
In this self-understanding, international institutions embody and protect the
"ideals of universalism, humanitarianism, peace, security, and human rights."'
Legal argumentation presents itself as supra-political; whereas politics is passion,
"[t]he very identity of international law seems based on its capacity to set itself
on the side of reason, in opposition to the passionate, the irrational."2 Although
* Guy Fiti Sinclair holds BA and LLB(Hons) degrees from the University of Auckland and is
currently Legal Advisor at Unitec New Zealand. The author is grateful to Professor Antony Anghie for his
comments on an early draft of this essay; thanks also to the ILSA Journal editorial team.
I. Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold
War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 477 (1997).
2. Martti Koskenniemi, Faith, Identity, and the Killing of the Innocent: International Lawyers
and Nuclear Weapons, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 137 (1997).
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the origins of international law are regrettably tainted by association with racist
theories based on cultural differences,3 the discipline has thankfully and
decisively distanced itself from those raw beginnings. Indeed, the concept of
race has all but disappeared from contemporary international law, except where
international law instruments explicitly oppose and seek to eradicate racism.4
In this essay, I challenge the above depiction of international law as having
entirely detached itself from the racist worldview and theories that shaped its
genesis. In considering the history of Western contact and influence in the
Congo, it becomes apparent that international law has repeatedly excused or
obscured the human suffering caused by the actions of Western powers in
relation to the Congo and its peoples. In two key "moments" in that history-at
the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 and again in 1960 when United Nations
(UN) peacekeepers forcibly intervened in the newly-independent state-
international law and international lawyers provided ready justifications for
Western interference in the Congo. In both instances, events central to the
development of international law and institutions resulted in lasting calamity
for the Congo.
After reviewing the colonial and post-colonial history of the Congo, I
argue that the events surrounding the 2005 Armed Activities case, 5 and the
judgment of the International Court of Justice (the Court or ICJ) in that case,
replicate and compound the historical connections between Western interests
3. See Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical
Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REv. 887, 897-900 (2000) [hereinafter Civilization]; and Antony Anghie, Finding
the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 1, 5 (1999) [hereinafter Peripheries].
4. E.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30,1973,1015 U.N.T.S. 243; and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, (especially art 6, on Genocide, and art. 7, on Crimes Against Humanity, including
the "crime of apartheid").
5. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Armed Activities]. For a summary of the case, see Margaret E.
McGuinness, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo: The ICJ Finds Uganda
Acted Unlawfully and Orders Reparations, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-ASIL Insights
(Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/01/insights060109.html (last visited Oct. 17,
2007). The Court's decision has received some early criticism. See Phoebe N. Okowa, Case Concerning
ArmedActivities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 55 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 742 (2006); Ryszard Piotrowicz, The Easter Bunny, the Tooth Fairy, Santa Clause and the
Security Council: A Heart of Darkness at the ICI, in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, 80 AUSTL.
L.J. 162, 164 (2006); Jorg Kammerhofer, The Armed Activities Case andNon-state Actors in Self-Defence
Law, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 89, 89 (2007); Guy Fiti Sinclair, Don't Mention the War (on Terror): Framing
the Issues and Ignoring the Obvious in the ICI's 2005 Armed Activities Decision, 8 MELBOURNE J. INT'L
L. 124, 125 (2007).
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and international law in that country. Conspicuously absent from the Armed
Activities judgment is any consideration of the complex events leading up to the
particular conflict that was the subject of the Court's inquiry. In particular, the
judgment makes no mention of the role of Western countries in creating the
conditions for and sustaining that conflict. Going a step further, I show that
international law and institutions are themselves to a degree culpable in the
most recent series of catastrophes afflicted upon the Congo.
The Congo, itself in a sense invented by the colonial project, continues to
be impacted negatively by Western interests, both directly and via its
neighbours. In conclusion, I argue that the Court's failure to acknowledge the
force of that impact, as well as the role of international law and institutions in
the Congo's disastrous history, has the effect of further extending the
regrettable record of international law in relation to that country.
II. REMEMBERING THE PAST: Two KEY 'MOMENTS' IN THE HISTORY OF THE
CONGO AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Berlin Conference, Imperial Expansion, and the Creation of the
Congo Free State
Imperial involvement in the Congo proper was initiated in an unusually
formal manner at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885,6 convened at a time of
rapid expansion by European colonial powers as well as the transition from
informal to formal empire.7 Amidst general concern that disputes over African
territory might lead to conflict between the European powers, the Conference
sought "to channel the scramble in Africa into pacific channels."8  The
Conference was therefore central to the expansion of colonialism in Africa at
the end of the nineteenth century, and thus to the expansion of international law
to new areas of the globe.9
6. Inhabitants of the Kingdom of the Kongo first made contact with Portuguese explorers in the
fifteenth century; these explorers were followed soon afterwards by missionaries and then slave traders who,
over the following centuries, decimated the local population. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST:
A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 7-11 (1998).
7. MARTIi KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CRvILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, 116-20 (2001). On the Conference generally, see ARTHUR BERRIEDALE
KEITH, THE BELGIAN CONGO AND THE BERLIN ACT (1919); S.E. CROWE, THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN
CONFERENCE 1884-1885 (1942); BISMARCK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN AFRICA CONFERENCE
1884-1885 AND THE ONSET OF PARTITION (Stig Fo-rster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Ronald Robinson eds.,
1988).
8. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 123.
9. See H. L. Wesseling, The Berlin Conference and the Expansion of Europe: A Conclusion, in
BISMARCK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN AFRICA CONFERENCE 1884-1885 AND THE ONSET OF
PARTITION 527, 533-34 (Stig Fo"rster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Ronald Robinson eds., 1988).
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The creation of an "independent" state in the Congo was, in turn, central
to the Berlin Conference. Prior to the Conference, King Leopold II of Belgium
had sought to gain influence in the Congo basin through the explorer Henry
Stanley, who made his name depicting the Congo and its inhabitants for a
European audience eager to be titillated by his (self-starring) narratives of
heroic white men bringing the light of civilization and God to the savages of
Africa." Under the flag of the King's "International Association of the
Congo," Stanley established trading stations along the Congo and entered into
hundreds of "treaties" with local chiefs, ceding authority to the Association."
Before, during, and after the Conference, the King's representatives arranged
a series of bilateral agreements with European countries recognizing the
Association as a sovereign state.2 The Association, which was signatory to the
General Act of the Conference13 and soon afterwards metamorphosed into the
"Congo Free State,"' 4 was intended to embody the new imperial spirit
expressed at the Conference and in the General Act. As an international
organization similar to the Red Cross, it would administer the territory of the
Congo neutrally, according the benefits of free trade and the blessings of
civilization to all.
15
Much has been written about the horrific atrocities committed in the "Free
State," as King Leopold sought to extract maximum material wealth from his
new colony.' 6 Suffice it to say that the ruthless exploitation of the Congo's
natural resources-principally ivory and rubber-exacted a terrible toll on the
indigenous inhabitants of the Congo basin; it has been estimated that Leopold's
10. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 51.
11. MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD IL THE CONGOFREE
STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH 71-72 (2002); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 63-72.
12. KEITH, supra note 7, at 62. See also HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 84-87; EwANS, supra note
11, at 98-99.
13. KEITH, supra note 7, at 63.
14. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 84-87; EwANS, supra note 11, at 103-08. The precise legal and
political means by which a sovereign state in the Congo emerged is rather obscure: KOSKENNIEMI, supra note
7, at 165. But it seems clear enough that the state was "an international legal fiction," non-existent prior to
the Conference. Jesse S. Reeves, The Origin of the Congo Free State, Considered from the Standpoint of
International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 108 (1909).
15. KEITH, supra note 7, at 58-63. See also Civilization, supra note 3, at 904; and ANTONY
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (2005) [hereinafter
IMPERIALISM]. Undoubtedly driven by King Leopold's desire for a personal colony, the creation of the "Free
State" was also convenient to other European countries with an interest in free trade in Africa. See
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 157; James Thuo Gathii, How American Support for Freedom of Commerce
Legitimized King Leopold's Territorial Ambitions in the Congo, 37 STUDIES IN TRANSNAT'L L. POL'Y 97,
(2005).
16. See, e.g., E.D. MOREL, RED RUBBER: THE STORY OF THE RUBBER SLAVE TRADE FLOURISHING
ON THE CONGO IN THE YEAR OF GRACE 1906 (1970), especially section I; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 6;
and EWANS, supra note 1I, at 11.
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rule reduced the population of the territory by half, or roughly ten million
people. 7 Persistent reports of the atrocities committed in the young "state"
eventually led to an international outcry, and in 1908, the Congo finally came
under the formal rule of Belgium.'
The manner of the Free State's creation has had lasting effects on the
peace and security of the Congo. The arbitrary way in which African
boundaries were agreed between European powers during the colonial period
led to the artificial segregation of familial, cultural, ethnic, tribal, and linguistic
groupings, with the result being that most colonial (and later national) borders
bore almost no relationship to pre-colonial entities. 9 Makau wa Mutua has
argued that the Berlin Conference itself "was the genesis of many present-day
conflicts and virtually insoluble problems in the African Continent,"' and that
the post-colonial state in Africa is "doomed" because of its "normative and
territorial construction on the African colonial state, itself a legal and moral
nullity."'" In a region of arbitrary borders, the Congo's geographical and
historical centrality makes it the "most fictional state in the region."2 More-
over, King Leopold's rule established a pattern of domination, suppression, and
exploitation that continued in the Belgian colony and beyond, into
independence. 23 The model of economic predation established by Leopold
became "deeply ingrained in institutional, political, and even social and
psychological dynamics,"24 resulting in the "violent, unaccountable, uncon-
trolled, inequitable, and neo-patrimonial" exploitation of natural resources, not
only in the Congo itself but in the whole region.25
B. Decolonization, Intervention, and the Cold War
Belgian involvement in the Congo did not cease upon the latter's
independence in July of 1960. Immediately after independence, Belgian forces
17. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 232-33.
18. Id. at 257-59.
19. Peter Uvin et al., Regional Solutions to Regional Problems: The Elusive Search for Security
in the African Great Lakes, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 67, 69 (2005); Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the
Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1135 (1995).
20. Mutua, supra note 19, at 1142.
21. Id. at 1116.
22. CHRISTIAN P. SCHERRER, GENOCIDE AND CRISIS IN CENTRALAFRICA: CONFLICTROOTS, MASS
VIOLENCE AND REGIONAL WAR 328 (2002).
23. Herbert F. Weiss & Tatiana Carayannis, The Enduring Idea of the Congo, in BORDERS,
NATIONALISM AND THE AFRICAN STATE 135, 136-39 (Ricardo Rend Lardmont ed., 2005). On Belgian rule
in the Congo, see generally OsrrA G. AFOAKU, EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AUTOCRACY AND DISSENT IN AN AMBIVALENT WORLD, ch. 2 (2005).
24. Uvin et al., supra note 19, at 75.
25. Id. at 74.
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conducted what they claimed was a humanitarian intervention for the protection
of Belgian nationals in the Congo.26 Soon afterwards, at the request of the
Prime Minister and President of the new Republic of Congo, a UN peace-
keeping mission was established in the Congo that would continue until 1964
and become one of the most ambitious, expensive, controversial, and violent
peacekeeping operations in UN history, at least until the 1990s.27 During the
same period, the popular Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated,
for which the Belgian government accepted "moral responsibility" in 2002.28
The events in the Congo in the early 1960s, and the steps taken by the
Secretary-General, the Security Council, and peacekeeping troops on the
ground, were extraordinarily complex, and could hardly be summarized here.29
Indeed, one of the long-term effects of the Congo mission was the groundswell
of international opinion it produced in opposition to UN involvement in "messy
internal conflicts involving peace enforcement. 30
Of more lasting impact on the Congo, the severity of the 1960-64 crisis
raised the possibility of Soviet influence in the heart of Africa, ultimately
brought Mobutu Sese Seko to power (in 1965, after the withdrawal of the UN
mission) and "supplied the initial legitimating text" of his regime.31 Fears of
division, anarchy, and ethnic strife helped to justify intervention by UN
peacekeepers; colonial conceptions of the Congolese as irrational and childlike
justified the imposition of the "strong man" Mobutu to prevent the degeneration
of the Congo into chaos or, perhaps worse, communism.32
26. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATTACKS 78 (2002).
27. In all, the mission required 93,000 personnel from thirty-four states and cost over
US$400,000,000. ESREF AKSU, THE UNITED NATIONS, INTRA-STATE PEACEKEEPING AND NORMATIVE
CHANGE 100-01 (2003).
28. Thomas Turner, Crimes of the West in Democratic Congo: Reflections on Belgian Acceptance
of 'Moral Responsibility'for the Death of Lumumba, in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES & THE WEST: HISTORY
AND COMPLICrrY 230, 230 (Adam Jones ed., 2004).
29. On the operation, see generally KING GORDON, THE UNITEDNATIONS IN THE CONGO: A QUEST
FOR PEACE (1962); D.W. BOwET, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY, 153-245 (1964); ARTHUR
LEE BURNS & NINA HEATHCOTE, PEACE-KEEPING BY UN FORCES (1963); ERNEST W. LEFEVER, CRISIS IN THE
CONGO: A UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN ACTION (1965) [hereinafter CRISIS IN THE CONGO]; ERNEST W.
LEFEVER, UNCERTAIN MANDATE: POLITICS OF THE U.N. CONGO OPERATION (1967); TREVOR FINDLAY, THE
USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS, 51-86 (2002); ADRZEJ SITKOwSKI, UN PEACEKEEPING: MYTH
AND REALITY 63-76 (2006).
30. FINDLAY, supra note 29, at 81, 87; see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Constitutional Crisis at
the United Nations: The Price of Peace-Keeping, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 621 (1965); Eric Stein, Mr.
Hammarskjold, the Charter Law and the Future Role of the United Nations Secretary General, 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 9 (1962).
31. Crawford Young, Zarre: The ShatteredIllusion of the Integral State, in THE DECOLONIZATION
READER 414, 423 (James D. Le Sueur ed., 2003).
32. KEVIN C. DUNN, IMAGINING THE CONGO: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF IDENTITY 87-91
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Under Mobutu, whose rule lasted until 1997, the state became "an
incarnate of its colonial predecessor."33 For nearly thirty years during the Cold
War, Mobutu received the unwavering support of the United States (US),
France, and Belgium through direct and indirect intervention, technical,
military, and financial support.34 As during the colonial period, that support
was also motivated by interest in the Congo's vast natural resources.35 It is
difficult to estimate the effect on the Congo of over three decades of Mobutu's
cruel, kleptocratic, and nepotistic autocracy.36 It is even more difficult to guess
what might have replaced him had he been deposed sooner. However, it is
undeniable that Mobutu's rule would not have lasted as long had it not been for
the support of these Western powers.
C. International Law as Apologism
In both of the key "moments" described in this section, international law
and international lawyers played an important part in explaining, justifying, and
apologizing for Western interference in the Congo. In the nineteenth century,
the extension of European empires was supported by positivist theories which
constructed a more explicit rationale for colonialism no less expertly than the
other nascent sciences of the age.37 This rationale was based on the difference
between European and other cultures, conceived as a "gap" between the
civilized and the uncivilized,38 order and disorder that, if left unattended,
"raised the specter of European destruction at the hands of the savage to invoke
(2003); DAVID F. SCHMITZ, THE UNITED STATES AND RIGHT-WING DICTATORSHIPS, 1965-1989, 31-34
(2006).
33. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 14.
34. See generally id, at 61-87; CRAWFORD YOUNG & THOMAS TURNER, THE RISE & DECLINE OF
THE ZAIRIAN STATE, 363-395 (1985); and MICHELA WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF MR. KURTZ: LIVING ON
THE BRINK OF DISASTER IN MOBUTU'S CONGO (2000).
35. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 63. Each of the U.S., France, and Belgium had its own economic
ambitions in the Congo, in particular in relation to the country's mineral reserves. WRONG, supra note 34,
at 196-97. For the sake of simplicity, I use "the Congo" throughout this essay, including in relation to the
period during Mobutu's rule in which the state was called Zaire (October 1971 to May 1997).
36. Despite having vast natural resources, Afoaku estimated that by the early 1990s, living
conditions in the Congo were "among the most appalling in sub-Saharan Africa." AFOAKU, supra note 23,
at 74. On the political and economic aspects of Mobutu's rule, see generally DAVID J. GOULD,
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: THE CASE OF ZAIRE (1980);
AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 61-123; and Herbert Weiss, Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future
Polity, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY, 157-70
(I. William Zartman ed., 1995). On the disastrous results of Mobutu's "Zairianisation" of the country's
economy, see YOUNG & TURNER, supra note 34, 326-62.
37. Peripheries, supra note 3, at 80.
38. Id. at 5, IMPERIALISM, supra note 15, at 3.
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the necessity of international law."39 The necessity of overcoming this gap both
permitted great violence against "uncivilized" peoples and required rapid
doctrinal development tojustify their subjugation.40 A degree of flexibility was
also necessary. International law thus deemed Congolese chiefs to be suffi-
ciently sovereign for King Leopold's agents to enter into numerous "unequal
treaties," establishing his authority over huge swathes of the Congo basin, even
though strict positivist theories of sovereignty excluded "uncivilized" societies
from the province of international law.4 1
Through the instrumentality of the Berlin Act, international law lent the
appearance of legitimacy to the decisions of the European states present at the
Conference, "allow[ing] private interest to parade as public interest. 42In
paying lip-service to principles of free trade and native rights, the Act created
an illusion of propriety, masking the ugly reality of King Leopold's rule.43 The
establishment of Western sovereignty in the Congo appealed to international
lawyers who saw the need to avoid territorial conflict between European
powers, protect European settlers, and extend Western civilization to the
natives.' These lawyers were generally silent on the growing humanitarian
criticisms of King Leopold's rule of the Congo, except to defend that rule.45 At
least one scholar has linked the long silence of international lawyers to the
unusual circumstances of the Congo Free State's birth: "It was the anomalous
character in international law of the State which has made the Congo question
so difficult of treatment. The Congo State, not being the result of ordinary
conditions, could not be judged by ordinary standards." '46 Whatever the
reasons, there is no doubt that international law and international lawyers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries served as apologists for the prevailing
international system, and in particular for European imperialism in the Congo.
39. Annelise Riles, Aspiration and Control: International LegalRhetoric andthe Essentialization
of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723, 729 (1993).
40. Peripheries, supra note 3, at 7.
41. Id. at 40-41. On the disagreements among European international lawyers regarding the
effectiveness of such treaties, see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 127-41.
42. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 126.
43. Chapter 1 of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the Congo was headed:
"Declaration Relative to the Liberty of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo, its Embouchures and
Neighboring Country, and Disposition Connected Therewith." Article 6 of that chapter was headed:
"Depositions relative to the protection of the natives, of missionaries and of travelers, and also to religious
liberty." On the difference between the rhetoric of the Act and the reality on the ground, see Padideh Ala'i,
Leopold & Morel: A Story of 'Free Trade' and 'Native Rights' in the Congo Free State, 37 STUD.
TRANSNAT'L L. POL'Y 33,36-37 (2005) (citing the General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the
Congo, Feb. 26, 1885), reprinted in 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1909); Gathii, supra note 15, at 105.
44. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 145, 148.
45. Id. at 159-64.
46. Reeves, supra note 14, at 118.
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The UN peacekeeping mission of the early 1960s was recognized, then as
today, as marking a significant step in the development of that institution. Early
accounts described the UN mission as "the first in which the organization
imposed its will by force in a sovereign independent State" '7 and "the most
complex and protracted operation ever authorized, financed, and administered
by an international organization. ' 8 Even a recent appraisal of the mission
describes it as "probably the most complicated peace-keeping operation
initiated by the United Nations."' 9
In the wake of the UN peacekeeping mission, international lawyers
disagreed about the legal and constitutional basis of the UN action.5" Given that
the mission was initiated at the invitation of the Congo government, the issue
could have remained a merely academic one, but the circumstances of the
intervention and the wide-ranging engagement of the peacekeepers made the
Charter bases of the mission uncertain.5 The ICJ was asked to rule upon
whether certain expenses of the mission constituted "expenses of the Organiza-
tion" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter,52 requiring
47. GEORGE MARTELLI, EXPERIMENT IN WORLD GOVERNMENT: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO 1960-1964, 7 (1966). Martelli describes the UN mission in the Congo
as the "first experiment" in "world government," marking "a turning point in world history." Id. at 7.
48. CRISIS IN THE CONGO, supra note 29, at 17 1.
49. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations,
43 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 498 (2003). Trevor Findlay observes that:
the lessons of the Congo [in 1960-1964] with regard to the use of force are
uncomfortably familiar to those who witnessed the UN operations in Somalia, the
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone [thirty] years on. Indeed, had the
lessons of the Congo been learned and retained the mistakes of the latter missions
might never have occurred.
FINDLAY, supra note 29, at 82. The Congo mission also invites ominous comparisons with the post-war
occupation of Iraq. See Janeen Klinger, Stabilization Operations and Nation-Building: Lessons from United
Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960-1964, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 83, 84-85 (2005).
50. See, e.g., E. M. Miller, Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1961); Finn Seyersted, United Nations Forces Some Legal Problems, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 351
(1961); Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Law in Africa: The Congo Operation as a Case Study, 27 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 632 (1962); Quincy Wright, The United Nations and the Congo Crisis, 2 J. JOHN
BASSETT MOORE SOC'Y INT'L L. 41 (1962); G.I.A.D. Draper, The Legal Limitations upon the Employment
of Weapons by the United Nations Force in the Congo, 12 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 387 (1963); Oscar Schachter,
The Uses ofLaw in International Peace-Keeping, 50 VA. L. REV. 1096 (1964); R. SIMMONDS, LEGAL PROB-
LEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITEDNATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO (1968); ROSALYN HIGGINS,
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY: I AFRICA (1980); Agola
Auma-Osolo, A Retrospective Analysis of the United Nations Activity in the Congo and its Significance for
Contemporary Africa, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1975); Orakhelashvili, supra note 49, at 498-500.
51. John W. Halderman, Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 971,
990 (1962).
52. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 166-67, 175-79
(July 20).
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the Court to determine which provisions of the Charter the mission came
within.
The intense scholarly interest in the legalities (or otherwise) of the UN
mission contrasts starkly with the marked lack of attention by international
lawyers to abuses that occurred under the gaze of that mission, as well as later
developments in the Congo. As noted above, the "Congo crisis" was quickly
understood and manipulated in terms of Cold War dynamics: the United States
viewed the UN action as necessary to stymie communist expansion in central
Africa,53 and after supporting the initial Security Council resolutions the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) soon expressed opposition to the
mission. 4 In this geopolitical climate, the UN did not remain entirely neutral:
it has been described as being, at times, "the willing tool of Western inter-
ference," and complicit in the murder of Lumumba."
The Cold War continued to provide the lens through which the Congo was
viewed, at least until the early 1990s. For so long as Mobutu continued to
support its policies in the Cold War, he received support from the West (and in
particular the U.S.). 6 Despite widespread knowledge of the human rights
abuses under Mobutu's regime,57 there is remarkably little written about them
by international lawyers. By focusing on the formal reasons for the UN
mission, and largely (though not entirely) disregarding the political motivations
that sustained the Mobutu regime that succeeded it, the earnest legal analyses
that were published in the years immediately following the establishment of the
mission appear apologetic in aggregate effect, if not individual intent."
M]I. RECONSIDERING THE PRESENT: AN (EXPANDED) FACTUAL
MATRIX FOR ARMED A CTIVITIES
A. From Mobutu to Kabila
Following the end of the Cold War, Mobutu's usefulness to his Western
patrons waned.59 By the early 1990s, U.S. Assistant Secretaries for African
53. SCHMITZ, supra note 32, at 20.
54. Richard N. Gardner, The Soviet Union and the United Nations, 29 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
845, 846-47 (1964); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Constitutional Crisis at the United Nations: The Price of
Peace-Keeping, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 621, 638-41 (1965).
55. LUDO DE WITrE, THE ASSASSINATION OF LUMUMBA xxii, 51-57 (Ann Wright & Ren6e Fenby)
(translation from DE MOORD OP LUMUMBA).
56. SCHMITZ, supra note 32, at 34-35.
57. Id. at 33; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ZAIRE (1980).
58. A recent study comparing the various arguments and seeking to identify the correct legal bases
for the mission seems to exemplify a kind of after-the-fact apologism. Orakhelashvili, supra note 49, at
498-500. For an early assessment of the geopolitical maneuvering behind the UN operation, see LEFEVER,
UNCERTAIN MANDATE, supra note 29, at 75-148.
59. AFoAKU, supra note 23, at 89-90.
[Vol. 14:1
Sinclair
Affairs were publicly acknowledging that country's "poor human rights
record"6 ° and that U.S. policies during the Cold War era "were strongly
influenced by broader strategic interests, often to the detriment of other con-
siderations." 6' Despite belated attempts to foster partisan politics and
democracy in the 1990s, 62 the relatively sudden loss of Western support made
Mobutu's government more vulnerable to political opposition, unrest, and
rebellion.63
Just as Mobutu was losing the support of his Western friends, another
crisis was brewing in the Great Lakes region. Ethnic divisions that had been
fostered by colonial policy in neighbouring Rwanda reached a climax with the
genocide of Tutsis in April-July 1994.' The genocide ended with the
overthrow of the Hutu government and was followed by an exodus of Hutu
refugees across Rwanda's borders into the Congo and Uganda, creating further
instability in both of those countries. From refugee camps in the Congo, Hutu
militias, including some of the g~nocidaires, launched a series of attacks into
Rwanda and against Congolese Tutsis (Banyamulenge). The Rwandan army
then combined with Banyamulenge and other opposition groups to attack the
Hutu refugee camps and marched onwards to Kinshasa with help from Uganda,
Burundi, and Angola.65
The rebel leader who emerged from this complex set of events, and who
eventually succeeded Mobutu in May 1997, was Laurent-Dsird Kabila. As
time passed, however, Kabila proved unable to gain control of the Congo's
60. Herman J. Cohen, US Policy and the Crisis in Zaire, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 828, 829 (1991).
61. George E. Moose, USPolicy TowardLiberia, Togo, andZaire, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 437,438
(1993).
62. See John F. Clark, The Collapse of the Democratic Experiment in the Republic of Congo: A
Thick Description, in THE FATE OF AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS: ELITES AND INSTITUTIONS 96
(Leonardo A. Villalrn & Peter VonDoepp eds., 2005).
63. AFOAKu, supra note 23, at 91-117; Weiss and Carayannis, supra note 23, at 144-45.
64. Belgium administered the territory of Ruanda-Urundi under a League of Nations mandate, and
later as a trusteeship territory under the United Nations. The Belgian authorities "declared that each and
every person had an 'ethnic identity' that determined his or her place within the colony or the postcolonial
system." See John R. Bowen, The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict, in GENOCIDE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
READER 334, 336 (Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2002); Liisa H. Malkki, Speechless Emissaries: Refugees,
Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization, in GENOCIDE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER 334, 336
(Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2002). For example, a 1933 census of Ruanda-Urundi classified the whole
population as belonging to one of three ethnic groupings-Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa-based on individuals'
physiognomy and wealth. L.R. MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA'S
GENOCIDE 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter PEOPLE BETRAYED]. On the genocide and events leading up to it, see
generally GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995); LINDA MELVERN,
CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2004).
65. DtUNN, supra note 32, at 2-3; Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 145-46; AFOAKU, supra
note 23, at 137.
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border areas, which were so crucial to "his foreign sponsors" security.66
Popular opinion in the Congo gradually hardened against the foreign invaders,
as well as against Banyamulenge who were seen to be holding high positions
in Kabila's government and army.67 These developments required Kabila to
distance himself from his foreign sponsors, leading to overt military conflict
with Uganda as well as Rwanda.6"
The "second Congo War" (1998-2003), the events of which were in
dispute in Armed Activities, involved, at one time or another, the forces of no
fewer than nine African countries in armed conflict on the Congo's territory,
including Uganda, Rwanda, and other neighboring countries, many of which
were or claimed to be under attack by rebel forces based in the Congo.69
Shifting allegiances between the various state and non-state parties involved
made it very difficult if not impossible to identify culpability for each of the
innumerable human rights abuses that took place during this time. Suffice it to
say that these wars-and the ongoing conflicts in the Congo-have been
conducted at the expense of millions of lives.7"
B. Western Culpability in the Second Congo War
The role of Western states in these events was no less complex than the
events themselves. Firstly, the West must accept some responsibility for the
Rwandan genocide, not only because of the ethnic policies introduced during
the colonial period but also because of the support that it (especially France)
gave to the Hutu-favouring dictatorship of Juvrnal Habyarimana.7 l Secondly,
the Angolan and Ugandan opposition groups that maintained bases in the
Congo, and whose attacks provoked the support of those countries for Kabila,
did so with support from the United States via Mobutu, and in some cases
directly from the United States.72
66. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 150.
67. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 150.
68. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 150-51; see also Mwesiga Baregu, Congo in the Great
Lakes Conflict, in SECURITY DYNAMICS IN AFRICA'S GREAT LAKES REGION 59, 61-63 (Gilbert M.
Khadiagala ed., 2006).
69. Okowa, supra note 5, at 743. In 1999, the DRC also initiated actions in the ICJ against Burundi
(withdrawn in 2001) and Rwanda (withdrawn in 2001 and a new application made in 2002). Id.
70. An estimated 3.9 million people died as a result of the Congo wars between 1998 and 2004.
Benjamin Coghlan, Richard J. Brennan, Pascal Ngoy, David Dofara, Brad Otto, Mark Clements & Tony
Stewart, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey, 367 LANCET 44 (2006).
Described as "one of the most devastating humanitarian disasters of our day," the conflict displaced nearly
ten percent of the Congo's population. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 145.
71. PEOPLE BETRAYED, supra note 64, at 24.
72. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 147.
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Thirdly, the Clinton administration in the mid-1 990s provided Kabila with
diplomatic, military, strategic, and economic support, 7 and opposed a Security
Council resolution in 1996 that would have deployed an international force
effectively to defuse a rebellion led by Kabila.74 Following Mobutu's over-
throw, North American companies won multi-million dollar mining contracts,
and provided financial support for Kabila's war efforts.75 In all these ways,
moral if not legal responsibility for the second Congo war must be shared with
countries other than the parties immediately involved.
C. Implicating the International
Most commentaries on the Rwandan genocide have focused on the failure
of the international community, and the UN in particular, to respond quickly
enough to prevent such a massive loss of life.76 Similar accusations of inaction
and passivity can be and have been made against the UN and the international
community in relation to the wars in the Congo.77 Fighting continues in what
has been called the "Third Congo War," involving many more smaller actors
in relatively unstructured, localized, but no less deadly, conflicts. 78 Extreme
violence, including ethnically-targeted attacks and incursions by foreign troops,
have been observed by UN peacekeeping troops, mostly too small in numbers
to intervene effectively.79 Legal scholars and other commentators have warned
that Rwandan troops have long moved in and out of the Congo with impunity,0
that the Security Council has failed to provide sufficient troops to end the
73. Frangois Ngolet, African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire, 47 AFR. TODAY 65, 70
(Winter 2000).
74. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 143; Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 147-48.
75. Ngolet, supra note 73, at 70-71.
76. See Christopher J. Le Mon & Rachel S. Taylor, Security CouncilAction in the Name of Human
Rights: From Rhodesia to the Congo, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 227-28 (2004); PEOPLE
BETRAYED, supra note 64, at 85-87. Developing tensions in 1990-1993 were met with indifference; the
increasing frequency of attacks on Tutsi, particularly in the northwest provinces, was at least partly
attributable to the passivity of UN troops, while information about the seriousness of the situation was
withheld from the Security Council by the UN Secretariat. See PEOPLE BETRAYED, supra note 64, at 88,
111-12; Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke, Rwanda, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR
TO THE 21 ST CENTURY 483,492-95 (David M. Malone ed., 2004). Despite repeated pleas for help from UN
forces on the ground both before and during the genocide itself, the Security Council refused to commit more
forces or to authorize more proactive measures that could have staunched the bloodshed. PRUNIER, supra
note 64, at 277-80.
77. John R. Tatulli,ResolvingAfrica 's Longest Civil War: Updates ofthe Case ConcerningArmed
Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 903, 906 (2003).
78. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 157.
79. Uvin et al., supra note 19, at 81.
80. Kenneth W. Harrow, "Un Train Peut en CacherunAutre: " Narrating the Rwandan Genocide
and Hotel Rwanda, 36 RES. AFR. LITERATURES 223, 225 (2005).
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fighting in the Congo,8 and that the relative absence, impotence, and silence of
the international community is "striking in the face of a conflict which not only
has huge humanitarian consequences but a potential continental impact as
well."82
Apart from these charges of absence and passivity, the actions taken by
international institutions have often exacerbated already dire circumstances in
the Congo. After the Rwandan genocide was effectively completed, the
(French-led) UN Op6ration Turquoise allowed Hutu militias to cross the border
to the Congo, leading to the profound destabilization of eastern Congo and
creating conditions that led to the Congo wars.83 Hutu refugee camps were then
maintained in the Congo by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at
massive cost to international donors." The Rwandan government's requests for
the international community to disarm these Hutu refugees, who were launching
attacks on Rwanda and on Congolese Tutsis, fell on deaf ears, leading directly
to the invasion of the Congo by Rwanda, Uganda, and other neighbouring
countries, and the subsequent overthrow of Mobutu.85
More disturbingly, laments about the inaction of international institutions
have often masked just how involved the international community already has
been in the Congo.86 Michela Wrong tells of a report by a former director of
the Congo's central bank which exposed the complacency of international
financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank in the face of endemic corruption in Mobutu's government.87
Wrong argues that the report "made it impossible for the West to ever pretend
it was not aware of what was going on, bringing it face to face with its own
hypocrisy,"88 and suggests that the Congo's economy (and, by extension, its
security) would have benefited had the IFIs held Mobutu more accountable.89
81. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 248-50 (Malcolm Evans &
Phoebe Okowa eds., 2nd ed. 2004); Adekeye Adebajo, From Congo to Congo: UnitedNations Peacekeeping
in Africa after the Cold War, in AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT ON THE
CONTINENT 195, 2 10 (Ian Taylor & Paul Williams eds., 2004); SCHERRER, supra note 22, at 314-26.
82. Filip Reyntjens, Briefing: The Second Congo War. More than a Remake, 98 AFR. AFF. 241,
249 (1998).
83. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 146; PRUNIER, supra note 64, at 281-311.
84. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 137.
85. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 146.
86. Compare to Anne Orford's findings on the involvement of international organizations in
Rwanda prior to the genocide. ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-08, 158-59 (2003).
87. WRONG, supra note 34, at 196-97.
88. Id. at 189.
89. Id. at 199.
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Uganda and Rwanda, too, are clients of various IFI credit programmes.9"
One study reports that despite military spending above limits set by these
institutions, Uganda is rated among their top clients.91 Yet Uganda's positive
economic performance is closely linked to its military involvement in the
Congo: sales of natural resources and products stolen from the Congo "help
make Uganda appear as though it is improving its position as an example of
export-led growth and successful economic reform;"92 those reforms in turn
facilitate Uganda's exports of stolen Congolese goods, and attract further loans
and debt relief.93 Rwanda also continues to receive support from IFI pro-
grammes despite its alleged ongoing interventions in the Congo and claims by
the UN that its military uses income from exports of Congolese mineral
resources to finance those interventions.94 Angola and Zimbabwe, equally,
have reaped economic benefits from their military interventions in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and both the Congolese government
and rebel leaders have used their country's resources to fuel the war.95 It is no
exaggeration to suggest that all of the Great Lakes countries "are war
economies, at least in part.., linked through the sale and transit of resources
from the DRC. 96 According to reports for the Security Council, both the IMF
and the World Bank are aware of the war-profiteering by Uganda and
Rwanda; 97 this has not prevented the World Bank from praising Uganda for its
economic performance.98
The integration of the Congo wars into the global economy raises troubling
questions about whether the international community may be more deeply
implicated in the central African conflicts than it imagines.99 Arms used in the
conflict are sourced from countries in the industrialized North, including
permanent members of the Security Council,00 and multinational mining
90. William Reno, Uganda's Politics of War andDebt Relief, 9 REv. INT'LPOL. EcoN. 415, 426
(2002).
91. Id. at 427-28.
92. Id. at 425.
93. Id. at 425-26, 428.
94. Id. at 432.
95. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 180.
96. Uvin et al., supra note 19, at 74.
97. See, e.g., United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N.
Doc. S/2001/357 (Apr. 12, 2001). See also Korinna Horta, Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights and the
World Bank, 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 227, 231-33 (2002).
98. Horta, supra note 97, at 233.
99. Charles Cater, The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: Rethinking the Critical
Cases of Africa, in THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF ARMED CONFLICT: BEYOND GREED AND GRiEVANCE 19,
32 (Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman eds., 2003).
100. Id. at 33.
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corporations are directly engaged with various participants in the wars,
including those alleged to have committed mass atrocities.'0 ' Among the
resources fuelling the Congo wars are minerals used in the production of cell
phones and laptop computers,0 2 goods that are iconic of the processes of
globalization. These inter-linkages should lead us to question whether our era
of globalization and democracy, capitalism, and universalized human rights is
really any different from that of King Leopold, in our acceptance of mass
deaths for the sake of Western economic progress." The war in the Congo
may ultimately be found to be, like the Rwandan genocide that led to it, the
"indirect result of the expansion of the European-dominated international
system of the late nineteenth century," which "occurred mostly through
colonization."'"
IV. BLIND-SPOTS AND ASSUMPTIONS INARMEDACTIVITIES
A. The Court's Findings
In Armed Activities, the DRC claimed that Uganda had violated
conventional and customary international law in three areas. First, the DRC
claimed that by occupying DRC territory and actively extending military,
logistic, economic, and financial support to irregular forces there, in relation to
the principle of non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for
sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic matters. Second, the DRC
claimed that by illegally exploiting Congolese natural resources and pillaging
its assets and wealth, in relation to respect for sovereignty over natural
resources, the right to self-determination, and non-interference in domestic
matters. And lastly, the DRC claimed that Uganda violated conventional and
customary international law in relation to fundamental human rights by
committing acts of oppression, including killing, injuring, abducting, or
despoiling DRC nationals.'05 The Court found that Uganda had violated the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, had interfered in the DRCs
internal affairs and had committed a grave violation of the prohibition against
the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.'0 6 The
Court further found that Uganda was an occupying power in part of the DRC °7
and was internationally responsible for violations of international human rights
101. Id. at 32.
102. Reno, supra note 90, at 432.
103. Harrow, supra note 80, at 226.
104. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 9
(2005).
105. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 24.
106. Id. 165.
107. Id. 178.
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law and international humanitarian law"°8 and for its military's looting,
plundering, and exploitation of the DRC's natural resources.0 9 The Court did
not, however, uphold the claim that Uganda had violated the principle of the
DRC's sovereignty over its natural resources."0
B. Silence, Apology, and Utopianism
I have elsewhere examined how the judgment in Armed Activities frames
the legal issues of the case so as to ignore the most obvious resonances with
recent developments in international relations."' Specifically, the judgment
affects to ignore a series of issues that are of particular significance in the US-
led "war on terror"-including such controversial topics as pre-emptive self-
defense, armed attacks by non-state actors, acts of aggression, and "legal black
holes."
The manner in which the Court excludes these issues from the case is
striking enough. But an important element of the factual matrix of the case-
and indeed of all the conflicts that have afflicted central Africa for over a
decade-is also absent from Armed Activities. Remarkably, the judgment
makes no mention at all of the colonial histories of the parties and the other
participants in the Congo wars. Early in the judgment, the Court declares its
awareness of "the complex and tragic situation which has long prevailed in the
Great Lakes region," that there has been "much suffering by the local
population and destabilization of much of the region," and that "the instability
in the DRC has had negative security implications for Uganda and some other
neighbouring States.""' 2 At most, these observations would seem to suggest
that the Congo wars have a regional dimension. Certainly, the rulers and elites
of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and other central African countries have a huge
burden of responsibility for the economic disasters, corruption, and conflict that
have afflicted the region, including their avarice and brutality in the Congo
wars. Far from balancing these observations with due notice of wider
international responsibilities, however, the judgment indicates absolutely no
awareness by the Court that states outside the region might be culpable or
otherwise involved in the conflict in any way." 3 The account given by the
108. Id. 1219-20.
109. Id. 1246.
110. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 1 224.
111. Sinclair, supra note 5, at 124.
112. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 1 26.
113. It is possible, as Judge Simma writes, to "agree with everything the Court is saying in its
Judgment" while expressing concern about "certain issues on which the Court decided to say nothing." Id.
Judge Simma's separate opinion, 1 1.
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judgment is thus incomplete, lacking important details that, if included, would
have told a more nuanced and truthful story.
The gaps in the judgment's account are not remedied elsewhere in the
Court's decision.'14 In his separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans offers a passing
acknowledgement of the "hapless post-decolonization history" of the parties
and their "chronic instability."'' 5 Though conceding that both parties had "been
in the grip of merciless dictatorships" and that governments in post-Cold War
Africa have "sometimes come to power through external intervention,"116 Judge
Kooijmans does not specify that Western intervention, whether direct or
indirect, has been virtually constant in the region, and that Western support had
sustained those dictatorships. Even Judge ad hoc Kateka, who was appointed
to the Court by Uganda, refers to colonialism only once directly in his dissent-
ing opinion, in connection with the exploitation of ethnicity "by the colonialists
during colonial times.""' 7 He notes that as an "additional factor" the "terrible
history of unscrupulous dictators-all of whom had support from abroad,""' 8
but does not go further to identify the Western sources of such support.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the judgment, separate opinions, and
dissenting opinion all fail to make mention of the role of international law and
international institutions as described in this essay. No reference is made to the
nineteenth century doctrines and theories that justified King Leopold's
annexation of the Congo and concealed the pernicious effects of his regime; nor
any to the role of international institutions in facilitating the rise and prolonging
the rule of Mobutu; nor even to the international system and institutions that
contributed towards the conditions for the ongoing wars in the Congo.
These blind-spots in the judgment lend it a sense of apologism and,
paradoxically, utopianism. On the one hand, the judgment's silences have the
effect of concealing and excusing both Western interference in the Congo and
the culpability of international law in enabling that interference. On the other
hand, they have the unfortunate effect of divorcing the judgment from reality.
Thus, for example, the Court suggests that Uganda should have reported to the
Security Council any armed attack upon it by or from within the DRC;" 9 an
early academic response has ridiculed the Court's reasoning as "a complete
114. In the sense that the Court's decision includes both thejudgment and the separate and dissenting
opinions, see Hugh Thirlway, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinions: The Declarations and Separate and
Dissenting Opinions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONs 390, 396 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
115. Armed Activities, Kooijmans separate opinion, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 5, 8.
116. Id. 5,7.
117. Id. Kateka dissenting opinion, 9.
118. Id.
119. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 145.
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denial of reality because the Security Council almost certainly will do nothing,
or else will do too little too late."'
120
C. In Defence of the ICJ.: "Reification" in International Law
The criticisms made thus far may seem a little unfair to the ICJ. After all,
surely the members of that Court cannot be accused of racism: apart from
having been elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, 2 ' the
current composition of the Court includes members from developing countries
such as Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Morocco, Jordan, Mexico, and Venezuela.'22
It is also apparent from the record of proceedings in Armed Activities that the
judgment quite faithfully reflects the issues as raised by the parties to the case.
A careful review of those proceedings reveals that the submissions of neither
party dwelt particularly upon the history of colonialism in central Africa. On
one occasion, counsel for Uganda objected to the DRCs claim of "illegal
exploitation" of its natural resources and of violation of the "principle of
permanent sovereignty" of its people over its resources, stating that the charge
sought "to resurrect the ghosts of colonialism in Africa." '23  On another
occasion, in responding to allegations of human rights violations by Ugandan
troops, Uganda's representative referred to "long-standing ethnic conflicts in
eastern Congo... dat[ing] back to the colonial era when the Belgian rulers of
Congo fostered enmity" between two different ethnic groups. 124 On neither
occasion, however, did the DRC or Uganda seek to rely upon the fact of
colonialism, or any aspect of the colonial experience of any country, to support
their claims or refute the others. Moreover, even with respect to these few
references in the proceedings to the colonial past, the Court's remit was to
focus only on the particular legal issues placed before it; 25 any narrowing of
120. Piotrowicz, supra note 5, at 162. In his dissenting opinion, Judge ad hoc Kateka states: "It is
not enough for the Court to refer Uganda to the Security Council. It bears mentioning that many tragic
situations have occurred on the African continent due to inaction by the Council." Armed Activities, Kateka
dissenting opinion, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 38.
121. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 4, Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
122. International Court of Justice: The Court: Current Members, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=2&p3=1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
123. Public sitting held on Wednesday, April 20, 2005, at 10 a.m., CR 2005/9 (translation) 2,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 16/4315.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007); see also Public
sitting held on Wednesday, April 27, 2005, at 3 p.m., CR 2005/15 (translation) 30-31, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 16/4339.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
124. Public sitting held on Wednesday, April 20, 2005, at 3 p.m., CR 2005/10, 56, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/l 16/4317.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
125. Though obviously worried that the judgment may not be "seen as logical and fair in its
historical, political and social dimensions," Judge Kooijmans describes the Court's task as "compel[ling] it
to come to a clear and unequivocal determination of the legal consequences of acts committed during that
'complex episode."' Armed Activities, Kooijmans separate opinion, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 4, 3.
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those issues is simply a normal part of the judicial settlement process. 126 In its
contentious jurisdiction the Court is only able to recognize and address disputes
between the particular parties to a case, and should disregard broader historical
concerns. 1
27
Thus stated, the Court's narrow focus on the specific dispute and facts
before it appears reasonable and normal: that is simply the nature of inter-
national law and the dispute settlement process in the ICJ. I would argue,
however, that the nature of that law and process are far less settled than we
might be led to believe. James Boyle has shown how international law theorists
consistently "use" reification "to establish that the thing they want us to
recognize about international law is already there woven into every strand."'28
We have seen how positivist doctrines in the nineteenth century, though
apparently fixed, remained flexible enough to meet the needs of Western
imperial interests at different stages. And again in 1960, when sovereignty was
granted to the independent Congo, this sovereignty was of a "different form and
character" to that possessed by European states,129 and was immediately vitiated
by successive military interventions by Belgium and the UN. Antony Anghie
has noted that the sovereignty conferred upon decolonized Third World states
effected a clean break from the past, requiring those states to "relinquish their
own history and the claims that could arise from it."'13
In its own quiet way, the background work of international law doctrines
prevents the Court, and even the parties themselves, from considering the
possibility of assigning any kind of legal accountability for armed activities on
the Congo's territory to colonial powers, contemporary Western states,
international financial institutions, or multinational corporations. These
doctrines act as an invisible shield of unexamined assumptions, protecting
Western states and non-state actors alike against the possibility of legal action
for their role in the Congo's wars. What we "know" about how an international
court functions and the kinds of issues it can consider thus prevents us from
considering the possibility that the Court could use a wider lens in its
examination of the root causes of the dispute at hand.
126. See Sir Robert Y. Jennings, The Proper Work and Purposes of the International Court of
Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 33, 33-35 (A.S.
Muller, D. Raic & J.M. Thurinszky eds., 1997).
127. Id. at 36.
128. James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of
Language, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 327, 349 (1985).
129. Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 520 (2002).
130. Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home: " Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 445, 497 (1993).
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However, other possibilities are available to the Court. Judge Christopher
G. Weeramantry, for example, is widely recognized to have explored alternative
paradigms of international jurisprudence.13' Judge Weeramantry exemplified
in his judicial and extra-judicial writings an approach to international law that
combined due deference towards positive law with a "much wider type of
inquiry... extraordinarily broad ranging in its geographical and historical
sweep."' 13 2 In his dissenting opinion in the ICJ Advisory Opinion, Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 133 Judge Weeramantry "range[d] far
afield from traditional jurisprudential authority to draw on a range of macro-
historical and multi-cultural sources as well as philosophical considerations."' 34
The Court in its judgment--or any of its members in a separate or dissenting
opinion-could have adopted a similar approach, providing what Judge
Kooijmans referred to as "a 'thick description' of a complex episode."' That
they did not do so, in my view, has resulted in a decision from which it is not
sufficiently clear that the Court "is fully aware of the wider context and the
complexity of the issues involved," and which may therefore not be seen "as
logical and fair in its historical, political and social dimensions.' 36
V. CONCLUSION
There is a curiously repetitive pattern to the story of Western contact with
the Congo. At crucial points the Congo has been regarded as both anomaly and,
in retrospect, as avant-garde: at the Berlin Conference when a new sovereign
entity was created as a kind of internationally-administered territory, pre-
figuring the mandate system later developed under the League of Nations; 1
37
and again in a later era of brave new institutions, decolonization, and Cold War
131. Richard Falk, The Coming Global Civilization: Neo-Liberal or Humanist?, in LEGAL VISIONS
OFTHE21STCENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUROF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 15, 16 (Antony Anghie
& Garry Sturgess eds., 1998); Peter Kooijmans, Two Remarkable Men Have Left the International Court of
Justice, 13 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 343,344 (2000). For Judge Weeramantry's own understanding ofthe function
of the Court, see Christopher G. Weeramantry, The Function of the International Court of Justice in the
Development of International Law, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 309, 311 (1997).
132. Antony Anghie, C. G. Weeramantry at the ICJ, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 829, 834 (2001).
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134. Saul Mendlovitz & Merav Datan, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons: A Narrative of Affirmative Appreciation and Judge Weeramantry's Grotian Quest, in
LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21 ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 653,
668 (Antony Anghie & Garry Sturgess eds., 1998).
135. Armed Activities, Judge Kooijmans separate opinion, 2005 1.C.J. 116, 13. Judge Kooijmans
concluded that "[t]he task of a judicial body does not allow it to conclude with a 'thick description' of a
complex episode but compels it to come to a clear and unequivocal determination of the legal consequences
of acts committed during that 'complex episode."' Id.
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politics, when the Congo became a testing ground for a new kind of inter-
national "humanitarian" intervention that would become increasingly familiar,
and depressingly predictable, as time passed.'38 The patterns of governance and
exploitation that were established between these two episodes have indelibly
shaped the modem Congolese State, and have contributed their own part to the
creation of conditions that make the Congo particularly susceptible to violent
upheavals. Just as imperialist interference in the Congo preceded the Berlin
Conference, so too has it continued long after independence. The nature of that
interference has shifted with global political sea-changes, but has been no less
disastrous to the Congo's peace and security.
Knowledge of the recurring patterns in the Congo's history lends texture
and depth to our reading of the Armed Activities decision. Indeed, in recalling
and re-telling the history of conflict in the Congo, "past" and "present" quickly
become artificial categories, transcended by the continuity of imperialist
involvement in the Congo and its neighbours.'39 The act of remembering
imperialist and international culpability in the Congo wars suggests more
troubling connections with the Court's reluctance to engage with the issues that
have become controversial in the "war on terror." Firstly, it evokes the
possibility that the emerging doctrines of the "war on terror" may articulate a
new form of imperialism, linking present to past in disturbing ways. 4 '
Secondly, it suggests that a more profound and enduring terror may be sited in
the long history of the Congo's relationship with the West than in more recent
events involving international terrorist networks. And thirdly, the Court's
reluctance to engage with the principles of international human rights and
humanitarian law may betray an inchoate apprehension on the part of the Court
that, in some sense, the whole of the Congo has become a legal "black hole" or
"anomalous zone," '' beyond the reach of international law.
In the Congo, stories matter. As Kevin Dunn has demonstrated, images of
the Congo as the "heart of darkness"-invoking slavery, cannibalism, and
savagery, as well as division, anarchy, and ethnic strife-have been remarkably
resilient and flexible, providing easily adaptable justifications for each form of
138. With perfect circularity, UN peacekeepers are once again stationed in the Congo though, as in
Rwanda over a decade ago, they are largely powerless to prevent the ongoing violence. Adebajo, supra note
81, at 195.
139. In a similar vein, Kenneth Harrow has asked whether our narratives of the Rwandan genocide,
conceiving of it as unique and exceptional though explicable by a certain history, contain a self-serving
teleology that enables us to ignore the possibility that the genocide was neither unique nor exceptional.
Harrow, supra note 80, at 223-24.
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Historical Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 45, 47 (2005).
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Reyntjens states that by 1996-97, the state in the Congo "had virtually disappeared, thus leaving a 'black
hole."' Reyntjens, supra note 82, at 241.
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imperialism and foreign interference in the Congo. 14 2  This essay has
interrogated the narrative offered by the Court, looking past the account offered
in the judgment. The Court does not intend, of course, to tell a racist story; this
essay has also tried to suggest how the assumptions and cosmology of
international law prevent the Court from venturing beyond its immediate frame
of reference. But the judgment bears responsibility, too: the Court's expertise
and narrative power create reality as much as they reflect and conceal it. As
such, it must be questioned whether the judgment persuades, "on a self-
sufficient basis and throughout a heterogeneous world community, that the
Court'sjudicial authority has been correctly exercised."" More critically, the
judgment's silences allow us all-the Court and international law included-to
avoid taking responsibility:
There is only one account ... that needs to be heard .... It is the
account that refuses to leave the reader out of it: the account where
the past is not distanced from our lives, and where the consequences
are not over for us or for them; the account that refuses the comfort-
able position of distance and of mere observation. The account that
implicates us is all that matters now....
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